- Site: Heysham 1
- IR number: 22-005
- Date: April 2022
- LC numbers: 28
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of this inspection was to undertake an electrical engineering licence condition (LC) 28 compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 1 power station, in line with the inspection programme contained in the Heysham 1 integrated intervention strategy (IIS) for 2021/22.
The inspection also provided an opportunity to inspect the implementation of a sample of the arrangements established in relation to electrical safety at Heysham 1.
The inspection was carried out by an electrical specialist inspector with support from a nuclear associate. For the purposes of this report, the term “we” refers to the judgements and opinions formed by the electrical specialist inspector and nuclear associate during this intervention.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
We undertook a planned inspection of the implementation of the arrangements for LC 28 examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT) at Heysham 1 power station.
The inspection sample targeted the planned electrical work being undertaken as part of the reactor 2 2022 statutory outage 26 including the planned electrical EIMT activities from the station’s outage intentions document and any reactive electrical work emergent from the shutdown.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
In addition, the inspection sample targeted a sample of electrical safety aspects related to temporary electrical supply cables, contractors’ welfare facility installations, tools and equipment for testing for dead and/or live working, and portable electrical equipment.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Key Findings, Inspector’s Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
Based on the discussions, explanations and the sample inspected, on this occasion, we were satisfied that there were no significant shortfalls identified with the implementation of the established arrangements for LC 28 EIMT in relation to the planned electrical work undertaken as part of the reactor 2 2022 statutory outage 026. The targeted inspection undertaken confirmed that the planned EIMT activities during this shutdown were appropriate and that electrical plant and equipment was being maintained in accordance with the established arrangements.
From the discussions, explanations, sample inspected, and plant walkdown, on this occasion we were satisfied that there were no significant shortfalls identified with the implementation of the established arrangements for the electrical safety aspects of temporary electrical supply cables, contractors’ welfare facility installations, electrical isolations, tools and equipment for testing for dead and/or live working, and portable electrical equipment. There were no matters of significant safety concern identified with the electrical safety arrangements that were not already being addressed or are the subject of actions to take corrective measures within the station arrangements.
All the Heysham 1 staff spoken to throughout the course of this intervention presented a knowledgeable and professional approach and provided open and honest responses to our questions.
We considered that the implementation of the LC 28 arrangements for the reactor 2 2022 statutory outage 026 related electrical activities was judged to be adequate. Therefore, a ‘Green’ inspection rating, no formal action, was awarded.
We considered that the implementation of the arrangements of the electrical safety aspects for the contractors’ welfare facility installations, management of electrical isolations, tools and equipment for testing for dead, and portable electrical equipment were adequate.
Conclusion of Intervention
From the sample inspected, it is judged that for the electrical work activities undertaken at Heysham 1 during statutory outage 026, compliance against LC28 met the required standard, therefore a ‘Green’ rating, no formal action, was given.
Based on this targeted intervention there were no issues identified from the electrical work activities which would prevent ONR granting consent for Heysham 1 reactor 2 to return to service, subject to the completion of all the planned activities.
From the evidence gathered during this intervention, there were no matters identified that have the potential to impact significantly on nuclear safety. The implementation of the arrangements for electrical safety sampled were adequate and aligned with relevant good practice based on this intervention.