Office for Nuclear Regulation

Heysham 1 – Inspection ID: 22-003

  • Site: Heysham 1
  • IR number: 22-003
  • Date: April 2022
  • LC numbers: 14, 28

Executive summary

Purpose of Intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake an integrated compliance inspection of the conventional / nuclear fire safety provisions at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL’s) Heysham 1 (HY1) power station during the Reactor 2 statutory outage, in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the HY1 Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

We undertook an inspection of the implementation of arrangements for managing fire risks during the outage at HY1. This was achieved by reviewing compliance against the requirements of the Fire Safety Order 2005, by undertaking an assessment of the General Fire Precautions (as defined by Article 4 of the Order), and through examination of compliance against the Licence Conditions (LCs) listed below.

  • LC 14 – Safety Documentation – requires NGL to make and implement adequate arrangements for the production and assessment of safety cases.
  • LC28 – Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIM&T) – requires NGL to make and implement adequate arrangements for the regular and systematic EIMT of all plant which may affect safety.

The inspection took place whilst the station was in a planned outage period so that the arrangements for managing the increase in fire risks and any temporary fire arrangements could be assessed.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector’s Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Based on the discussions, explanations and the evidence sampled during the inspection, we considered that a clear understanding of the requirements to ensure continued compliance with the Fire Safety Order 2005. We also considered there were no significant shortfalls identified with the implementation of arrangements for LC 28 EIMT or LC 14 Safety Documentation in relation to nuclear fire safety management undertaken as part of the reactor 2 statutory outage.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence sampled during this inspection, it was judged that there were no matters that have the potential to impact significantly on life fire safety or nuclear safety. Consequently, an overall rating of Green was awarded for the general fire precautions arrangements, LC14 – Safety Documentation and LC28 – EIM&T. The inspection findings were shared and accepted by NGL as part of normal inspection feedback. ONR considers NGL adequately demonstrated ownership and implementation of arrangements for managing fire risks to ensure nuclear fire and life safety.

Based on these targeted interventions there were no fire safety issues identified that would impact on restart of R2.