- Site: Heysham 1
- IR number: 22-012
- Date: April 2022
- LC numbers: 26, 28
Purpose of Intervention
This intervention record covers:
- A planned inspection performed as part of an Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Operating Facilities Division (OFD) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (EDF NGL) during the 2022 statutory outage (026) of Reactor 2 (R2) at Heysham 1 (HY1) nuclear power station. The main purpose of this inspection was to inspect a sample of control and instrumentation (C&I) related statutory outage activities, in order to confirm they had been correctly carried out and that C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety will remain fit for their intended purpose until the next statutory outage.
- A follow-up inspection to review of the effectiveness of the maintenance arrangements that were implemented by HY1 to address maintenance record keeping arrangement shortfalls identified during the HY1 Reactor 1 (R1) 2020 statutory outage (025) ONR C&I inspection.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
The inspections covered by this intervention report were undertaken in support of ONR’s 2021/22 statutory outage inspection programme and integrated intervention strategy.
The inspections included a sample review of HY1 R2 2022 (026) statutory outage activities carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety, and considered compliance of the associated arrangements in relation to the following Licence Conditions (LC), which are applicable provisions of the Energy Act 2013:
- LC26 – Control and supervision of operations.
- LC28 – Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT).
The findings of this inspection will contribute to ONR’s regulatory decision to grant Consent to the return of R2 to normal operating service in accordance with LC 30 – periodic shutdown and the management of Regulatory Issue (RI) number 8441.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Key Findings, Inspector’s Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
During this inspection we sampled the EIMT activities related to C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety, as listed in the outage intentions document (OID) for the HY1 R2 2022 statutory outage. Based on the information provided, it appeared that these EMIT activities had either been satisfactorily completed or were on schedule to be completed. Where C&I EMIT activities remained outstanding, we were confident, based on the information provided, that these would be completed satisfactorily before the end of the outage.
During the inspection we held discussions with several C&I equipment and system stakeholders and found that they had a good understanding of the systems and equipment they were responsible for and that they appreciated the importance of the statutory outage work being undertaken. The inspection of the work activities covered during this intervention has found that the workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I suitably qualified and experienced persons (SQEP).
We did identify a small number of maintenance record keeping shortfalls and raised them with the relevant system engineers (SEs), who agreed to addressed them. It should be noted that we did not consider that these shortfalls posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or needed to be addressed before R2 returns to service.
During the plant walkdown, we found the standard of housekeeping was, on the whole, acceptable. However, we did find several items of foreign materials exclusion (FME) and unterminated redundant cables inside a number of cubicles. We therefore raised a RI to capture these issues and will monitor its progress through to resolution as part of normal regulatory business. It should be noted that we did not consider that these issues posed an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or needed to be addressed before R2 returns to service.
Based on the information presented to us, we were also content that the maintenance arrangements that were implemented by HY1 to address maintenance record keeping arrangement shortfalls identified during the HY1 R1 2020 statutory outage (025) ONR C&I inspection are proving to be effective.
Based on our sample inspection of the C&I aspects of the HY1 R2 statutory outage (026) we have assigned an intervention rating of Green for LC26 and 28 compliance.
Conclusion of Intervention
From the evidence gathered during this inspection of a sample of HY1 R2 2022 statutory outage (026) activities, we did not identify any C&I issues that would pose an immediate or significant risk to nuclear safety or prevent ONR issuing a Consent to allow R2 to restart. Therefore, from a C&I perspective, we recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R2 to return to normal operating service. This is subject to the satisfactory completion of the planned EIMT activities and any emergent work.