Office for Nuclear Regulation

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NOTES OF THE PUBLIC MEETING OF THE OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR)
HELD AT THE EXHANGE, BRIDGWATER
ON WEDNESDAY 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 AT 19.30

Panel Members:

Colin Patchett	- ONR Director of Civil Nuclear Reactors
Steve Nicolson	- ONR Site inspector Hinkley A
John Burrows	- ONR Site inspector Hinkley B
Tony McNulty	- ONR Site inspector Hinkley C
Pete Wilkinson	- Independent Chairman

Present

Alan McGoff	- Environment Agency
Dave Griffiths	- Environment Agency
Bryan Payne	- Department of Energy and Climate and Change
Simon Bouffler	- Health Protection Agency
Chris Bakken	- Director, EDF
Nigel Cann	- EDF
Nigel Knee	- EDF
David Eccles	- Head of Bridgwater EDF Office
Mike Harrison	- EDF Station Director
Peter Higginson	- EDF Technical & Safety Support Manager
Gordon Bell	- EDF Media Manager (South West)
Lee Talbot	- Magnox
Sue Marks	- Avon and Somerset Police
Cllr Ann Bown	- Ward Councillor for Wembdon and Cannington
Cllr Anne Fraser	- Sedgemoor District Council
Doug Bamsey	- Sedgemoor District Council
Claire Pearce	- Sedgemoor District Council
Anthony Trollope-Bellew	- Sedgemoor District Council
Victoria Banham	- Communication manager - Sedgemoor District Council
Susan Goss	- Member for Quantock Ward, West Somerset Council
John Edwards	- Parish Councillor in Spaxton
Cllr Peter Malim OBE	- Vice Chairman Stogursey Parish Council
Sheila Allen	- President Cannington Woman's Institute
Cllr Alan Breeley	- Cannington County Council
Cllr Mike Philips	- Cannington County Council
Cllr Rosemary Woods	- Williton Parish Council
Lesley Flash	- Stogursey Parish Councillor
Alan Hurford	- Bridgwater town council
Anne Reed	- Parish Councillor for Wembdon
Cllr Peter Malim OBE	- Vice Chairman Stogursey Parish Council
Tony Hurry	- Somerset County Council
Cllr Julian Taylor	- Sedgmoor Council
Marguerite Bowden	- The West Somerset Community College
Rebecca Musto	- Somerset County Council
Ron Allens	
Tom Boyd	
Jo Brown	- Parents Concerned About Hinkley
Stuart Hill	

Cecily Collingridge	- Stop Hinkley
Allan Jeffrey	- Stop Hinkley
Lydia Meryll	- Socialist Environment and Resources Association
Darren Smith	
Mike Short	- former chairman of the Hinkley Point Site Stakeholders Group
Caroline Waller	
Anne Lawrence	
Phil Burden	
David Griffiths	
Barry Prickett	
Mike Caswell	- Chairman of the Hinkley Point SSG
Alison Chapman	
Mr and Mrs Grant	
Phil Knibb	

And other members of the public

OPENING COMMENTS

Peter Wilkinson opened the meeting by explaining that he was acting as an independent chair. He explained that this is the second community engagement forum the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has held (the first being Sizewell in February 2012). It provided an opportunity for the public to ask questions about ONR's role in the regulation of safety and security at nuclear sites. P. Wilkinson also reminded the audience that ONR did not set policy as that was the role of government; ONR regulated against the law.

P. Wilkinson established ground rules in order to ensure a fair meeting and described the arrangements for publishing notes on the ONR website. P. Wilkinson stated that short presentations would be given by Colin Patchett (Deputy Chief Inspector) and by the Hinkley Point A, B and C ONR site inspectors. He asked for questions to be kept until the Q&A session after the refreshments break.

INTRODUCTION
Colin Patchett (ONR Deputy Chief Inspector)

Colin Patchett stated that one of the purposes of the evening was to explain ONR's role and answer questions about how we regulate. He said ONR wanted to be a listening organisation and improve its openness and transparency. For example, ONR now publishes online reports that explain its regulatory decisions - these are called project assessment reports. He said that sometimes, often for security reasons, ONR is unable to share as much information as it would like. Unlike the Environment Agency, ONR does not consult on decisions, but it does want to listen to people's concerns.

C. Patchett described the mission of the ONR as "to protect people and society from the hazards of the nuclear industry" and gave a brief history as follows:

- Nuclear regulatory framework in the UK has been in place for over 50 years
- ONR became an agency of the Health and Safety Executive on 01 April 2011 and expects to gain statutory corporation status April 2014. This enables increased flexibility in a more open and transparent format.
- The new organisation brings together the regulation of nuclear safety, security, safeguards and the safe transport of radioactive materials.
- The responsibilities held and regulatory requirements that duty holders have to comply with remain unchanged.

C. Patchett then described the sorts of site ONR regulates including nuclear power generation, decommissioning and defence sites.

ONR provides a lot of information on its website which has been recently improved following

feedback, http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/ and we also Tweet information on a regular basis. You can follow us @ONRpressoffice.

Steve Nicholson – Hinkley Point A site inspector

Steve Nicholson explained that as well as being site inspector for Hinkley Point A, he also had this role at Bradwell, Berkeley and Dungeness A. Hinkley Point A site started defueling in 2004. The site was now free from spent fuel (which contains most of the radioactive inventory), which had all been sent to Sellafield for processing. However, some radioactivity does remain on the site in the graphite core, the low level waste stores, the steel-pressure vessel and the ponds.

S. Nicholson explained that the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (who owns the site) decided two years ago not to decommission all the Magnox sites at the same time. In their Magnox Optimised Decommissioning Programme (MODP), NDA chose Bradwell and Trawsfynydd as lead-site for accelerated decommissioning, with progress at other sites (including Hinkley) having slowed.

S. Nicholson explained what his job entailed: ensuring the licensee maintains an adequate safety case, and that it focuses on control and containment of the radioactive materials on the site. His three main priorities were therefore: to ensure that waste is stored on the site safely; that asset management is sufficient to ensure that nuclear safety related plant fulfils its role; and that the progress of decommissioning is sufficient. He pointed out he asked for the rate of decommissioning to be increased and had asked for more stringent end-points for the care & maintenance (C&M) period. He described C&M as a situation where the site will be passively safe with wastes processed and stored and where advantage can be taken of radioactive decay, vastly simplifying dismantling at final site clearance in the future.

John Burrows – Hinkley Point B site inspector

John Burrows explained his role is focused heavily on the licence held by the station and was the key point of interaction with ONR. He described his work as comprising: compliance inspections, especially where these related to the strict rules which cover safety. He explained ONR expended 600 man-days of effort last year, with a quarter of this being work carried out on-site. He reminded the audience that it was for the licensee to continually prove they are compliant with the requirements placed upon them.

J. Burrows described that certain projects needed ONR's permission to go ahead. For example, it had been identified as reasonably practicable to install an additional shut-down mechanism in the unlikely event of the primary shutdown failing due to severe accident. Implementation of this new diverse shutdown system will require ONR permission.

Tony McNulty – Hinkley Point C site inspector

Tony McNulty explained the prospective new licensee, NNB GenCo, is proposing a two-unit European Pressurised-water Reactor (EPR) for the C site. So far, ONR's work had involved 30 ONR inspectors and that 2755 man-days of effort had been expended on the project. (correction from slide which says 2755 man-hours). Eventually NNB/ONR agreed that NNB was ready to apply for a licence. The key things that ONR looks at are organisational competence, governance, management system manuals, and arrangements made to meet the requirements for all 36 of the licence conditions. Another important part of this process is capturing the learning in ONR's updated licensing guidance, "Licensing Nuclear Installations" in June 2012.

T. McNulty explained that GDA (Generic Design Assessment), which ONR carried out jointly with the Environment Agency, is examining whether a generic design acceptance could be issued for the EPR design.

However, T. McNulty explained that before a site licence could be granted, a further Hinkley Point C (HPC) site-specific report would need to be produced and issued. This report would

consider things like site-suitability, external hazards, geology etc as well as organisational capability.

T. McNulty reminded the audience that if ONR issues a licence to NNB this did not give them permission to start construction, and in fact it would give ONR the full powers under the licence. Thus ONR will require NNB GenCo to seek its permission before start of construction, which is defined as pouring concrete for the first nuclear safety related structure.

---Refreshment break---

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

Chair's introduction
P. Wilkinson reminded the audience that transport issues and questions about infrastructure around the proposed Hinkley Point C site should be taken up with EDF and Somerset County Council, as these were outside ONR's remit. He read out pre-prepared statement from EDF:

"The construction of Hinkley Point C is the subject of an application for development consent made by NNB Generation Company Limited (part of EDF Energy) on 31 October 2011. This application is the subject of a detailed examination by the Planning Inspectorate. Interested parties have had the opportunity to make representations to the Planning Inspectorate on relevant planning matters, which include the impact of the proposed development on traffic and the adequacy of the local transport infrastructure. Furthermore, there has been considerable attention paid to transport issues in the application, and it has been the subject of detailed representations from interested parties and EDF Energy during the examination period."

"The Planning Inspectorate's examination will be completed shortly, and the Examining Inspectors will then provide a report to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change with recommendations. The full application and all other documents relating to the examination process are made available by the Planning Inspectorate on their website."

ONR had asked for topics in advance to be discussed at tonight's forum. These topics are:

- Hinkley Point A and decommissioning
- Hinkley Point B – safety and lifetime extension
- Proposed Hinkley Point C site
- Progress with new site licence application
- Generic Design Assessment
- Fukushima
- Low level waste monitoring
- Funding for decommissioning and reinstatement of site
- Emergency planning
- Access to information

Questions

1. Tom Boyd asked why ONR didn't have a view on transport issues. He was concerned that there would not be free access to emergency service and the evacuation of the site and/or local areas would be severely compromised.

1.1 C. Patchett introduced Paul Dicks (ONR Emergency Arrangements Team) who described the need for there to be an on-site plan, which was the licensee's responsibility and an off-site plan, which was Somerset County Council's responsibility. ONR sees these plans and also witnesses tests of the plans on a regular basis to ensure all duty holders were able to meet their responsibilities. ONR also cooperates and consults with various organisations and is trying to influence through the transport forum and steering group and also attends the emergency plan consultative committee.

1.2 Alyn Jones said Somerset County Council had agreed management measures, that the TIMP (Traffic Incident Management Plan) sets out broad guidelines and that some shortcomings had not gone unnoticed. Therefore the set of guidelines for the off-site plan have been updated.

1.3 The Chair asked for further questions relating to this issue to be taken off-line. T. McNulty reminded the audience that ONR's powers related to the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA) and Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR). He said that the adequacy of the on-site plan and the off-site plan had to be demonstrated to ONR on a regular basis.

1.4 T. Boyd replied that he had seen the plan, but reiterated he did not feel a 56 mile detour to get to the site in the event of road blockages was acceptable. He said an additional D or E site would only make things worse. C. Patchett explained that we operated within the powers given to us.

1.5 Nikki Clark asked if ONR 'ever said no'. C. Patchett stated that ONR does take action and in the past EDF reactors in the UK had been shut-down for long periods due to ONR's safety concerns.

1.6 T. McNulty said that as part of ONR powers under the nuclear site licence, it would require prospective licensee for Hinkley Point C, NNB GenCo, to divide the Hinkley Point C project into phases, and progress to the next phase needs our formal permission. If at any point the on-site or off-site plan was compromised by traffic issues or the number of people on the site, ONR would not issue permission.

2. Hinkley Point A decommissioning

2.1 Jo Brown asked ONR to enforce the re-sealing of the cores at Hinkley Point A, stating that operations involving intermediate level waste (ILW) and the liquids in the vaults did not put safety first. She reported that the local health authority had raised an issue with the Health Protection Agency relating to a report published in the British Medical Journal in 1988 which showed an increase in leukaemia in children and young people around the Hinkley Point A site.

2.2 S. Nicholson replied that the vents were put into the reactor to improve long-term safety, removing the risks associated with a pressure vessel. He said the discharges from the vents were monitored and were low and that the Environment Agency is responsible for regulating discharges from the site.

2.3 Simon Bouffler said radiation risk was related to dose - the higher the dose, the higher the risk. He also stated that Hinkley Point A presented a very low risk in terms of radiation induced cancers and the use of radiation had to go through a process of justification and optimisation, weighing up the positive and negatives to form a

balanced judgement. J. Brown asked whether HPA had a view on the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) risk model. S. Bouffler stated that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation undertakes reviews of the scientific literature on radiation health risk. The ICRP risk-model is based on these reviews and is still valid; HPA endorses the use of ICRP risk models. J. Brown stated that numerous studies had "discredited" the ICRP risk model showing that it did not protect children with leukaemia, cancers and genetic mutations. The Chair said that at the current time ONR has to accept the HPA's advice and ended the discussion at this point.

3. Hinkley Point B – Safety and lifetime extension

3.1 Cecily Collingridge asked ONR if it could place on its website a plan showing the state of the Hinkley Point B core, information about the cracks in a form which can be easily understood by members of the public. She also asked whether a tool developed to look at the cracking, New In-core Inspection Equipment (NICIE), was being used by EDF across the fleet.

3.2 J. Burrows said that NICIE was used and that EDF had an algorithm to optimise the inspection process.

3.3 C. Collingridge re-stated her request for the state of the graphite from all previous inspections to be placed on the ONR website. She raised concerns over the safety case and asked what residual strength was left in the core and how many channels have been inspected and how many haven't.

3.4 C. Patchett explained that there were general misunderstandings on the regulation of reactor lifetimes. He said it was up to EDF to demonstrate to ONR how long the reactors could be safely and securely operated, and it was ONR's job to decide it was safe to do so. He said ONR carries out regular inspections on the site, and that EDF had to carry out periodic safety reviews to justify to ONR why EDF think it is safe to continue to operate. C.Patchett said placing detailed information about the graphite core on its website could put ONR in a difficult position as this could compromise security, but stated that the key issue was - could the control rods be inserted into the core? Small cracks do not affect this. Action: ONR agreed to discuss what could be made available with the operator (EDF).

3.5 J. Brown asked how many unplanned outages there had been on Hinkley Point B station over the last four years. She suggested that the high number of shutdowns were a sign of serious risks. J. Burrows agreed that there had been a higher number over this period but that this was a result of generic issues. He said that the rate of incidences had fallen off, that the route causes showed no common link and that at the moment he has no reason to be concerned about this.

3.6 N. Clark asked about the control rods at Hinkley Point B: why they we were being articulated when that was not the case before now; whether that was because the pressure vessel has moved and questioned whether Hinkley Point B should have originally had a tertiary shutdown system. J Burrows stated that the super-articulated control rods give a greater ability to shutdown the reactor in the event of a severe incident and so improves safety and it was not the case that rods were being articulated because the pressure vessel has moved. The station had principled control rods, driven rods, a nitrogen hold-down system and super-articulated control rods: these measures gave defence in depth to shutdown the reactor.

3.7 Alan Jeffrey said he understood that the tertiary failure system should have had boron beads but nitrogen and articulated control rods were used instead. J. Burrows stated that every 10 years a periodic safety review is carried out and as a result boron beads, boron dust and super-articulated control rods and nitrogen hold-down were all considered. Super-articulated control rods and nitrogen hold-down were considered to be the best.

3.8 A. Jeffrey asked why the reactors had been down-rated to 70%. J. Burrows replied that this was in response to concerns regarding joints on the boiler tubes. The licensee needs to justify that it is safe to operate at a reduced level.

3.9 Peter Smith asked whether the nitrogen hold-down system was passive one. J. Burrows stated that the Boron beads relied on gravity to deploy them whereas the nitrogen system was under pressure using an ambient vaporiser.

4. Hinkley Point C

4.1 Cllr Peter Malim said he was very concerned about Hinkley Point C because it was different from the A and B stations in that the intention was to store all the used fuel on site potentially forever and that this was a change in policy for the storage of higher activity wastes. He asked to hear ONR's view about this change in storage of waste.

4.2 C. Patchett said that ONR does not set policy on long-term storage of waste, but it was ONR's job to ensure that waste was stored safely. Final disposal was a matter for government policy. C. Patchett invited Brian Payne from the Department of Energy and Climate Change to respond to the question.

4.3 B. Payne said government policy was clear: that it was to use deep geological storage and it took a voluntary approach to plans to host the GDF (geological disposal facility) and were looking for local communities to come forward.

4.4 A. Jeffrey suggested he'd heard that the community in Kent who had originally come forward to host the GDF had voted "no" and he understood that the community in Cumbria was about to do the same leaving the government in the position of having no site for the GDF. He asked how ONR would be able to licence a new reactor with no route for used fuel. He said in the US the same problem now exists, since plans for the Yukka Mountain repository had been abandoned, the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission – US equivalent of ONR) have been unable to licence new reactors.

4.5 C. Patchett said that the licence required organisational capability and management from construction, through operations to decommissioning. Completing decommissioning depends upon removal of the fuel, until disposed of the fuel can be stored on-site safety. If there is no long tern strategy for final disposal, as long as that material is stored safely on site. When ONR inspectors walk round these sites, they want to be confident that storage systems are robust. C. Patchett reassured the audience that the storage systems are robust. Also, he said that ultimately ONR has to regulate to make government policy safe.

4.6 B. Payne said the specification for the GDF was clear and that Cumbria had yet to decide whether it wanted to host the GDF.

4.7 A questioner asked if ONR would be prepared to chair a local session on storage of fuel on site. He suggested that remote storage facilities are a major risk.

4.8 C. Patchett said that the people responsible for the decisions are EDF; they need to make the case to allow on-site storage and ONR assesses it. ONR's role is to regulate to ensure it is safe. With regard to the point about a local discussion, C. Patchett stated that it is not something ONR could do as it is EDF's responsibly to make the case to allow on-site storage.

4.9 Mike Harrison explained that his site held the nuclear site licence and that it makes provision for storage of used-fuel. He also stated that EDF will set out how it intends to decommission and how it intends to fund that decommissioning.

4.10 Jean Crillis asked about regulatory assessments – does it cover spent fuel. C. Patchett said ONR looks at the capability of the plant and looks at any items which hold radioactive materials.

4.11 N. Clark said that no one has a remedy about what to do with the waste and that government policy doesn't look at the issue properly and expressed concern that diesel generators may be required to keep the fuel cool. C Patchett said that whilst he accepted people had concerns about safety, ONR is here tonight to demonstrate how it is ensuring high safety standards at nuclear sites.

4.12 David Griffiths asked about how the stress-tests justify the safety of the reactor sites. C Patchett said that the stress tests were an EU requirement to demonstrate resilience of the plant. ONR is working with EDF to ensure that enhancements are made in a timely way. Since Mike Weightman's Fukushima report, there have been real practical improvements including a provision of additional equipment and reviewing adequacy of the infrastructure in the UK. C. Patchett stated that an update on progress against the actions in Mike Weightman's report would available at the end of October.

4.13 D. Griffiths said that the stress tests did not prove the sites were safe. C. Patchett stated that the reactors are not allowed to start up if not safe, and that the recent plant improvements provided enhanced resilience against remote events.

5. Generic Design Assessment

5.1 C. Collingridge said she wanted a meeting with ONR to focus on the issue of waste and a meeting to talk about GDA, as she has significant concerns about the number of open issues including control instrumentation, stating that the benchmark had been lowered in order to meet a schedule for closure of all GDA issues. She said ONR should look at this issue and invite John Large to a meeting to review the outstanding issues and then schedule a public meeting to review.

5.2 C. Patchett stated that ONR had already put a lot of information about GDA into the public domain and that ONR will only make a decision about the UK EPR reactor design (the design currently being assessed as part of GDA) once the information it requires is provided. C. Patchett reminded everyone that GDA does not give permission for construction of Hinkley Point C. We have to give consent to pour the first "nuclear safety related" concrete. He said he would be unable to agree to the meeting tonight but agreed to look at this. **Action: ONR's next non-governmental organisations conference in November is the forum at which to discuss GDA.**

5.3 Crispin Aubrey said that John Large had raised two important points. First, that there are concerns with government policy pushing ONR to reach conclusions by the end of the year and secondly that John Large had tried to find justification documents for decisions made by ONR but cannot find them.

5.4 C. Patchett stated that there is no government pressure. If ONR makes a decision regarding the UK EPR reactor design, it will publish a report online justifying its decision. John Large had asked ONR for a lot of information in relation to GDA under a Freedom of Information Act request and that ONR was working to secure the release of the information, but the process was time consuming because it involved some information to be redacted and required agreement to release otherwise ONR may be in breach. (To note - there is a lot of information already available about GDA on the new reactors website: www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors, especially in our quarterly reports here: http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/quarterly-updates.htm).

6. Fukushima

6.1 J. Brown suggested that ONR is basing its judgment on how Fukushima (type events) affected nuclear reactor safety based solely on Mike Weightman's report. She asked

whether ONR has read Gordon Taylor's report, which looks at the issues in more detail, and suggested that Mike's report was too superficial.

6.2 C. Patchett emphasised that Mike Weightman had actually been to Fukushima and visited the plant and talked to very many people there. He said Mike's report was very detailed and did not accept the idea that it was superficial. There had been an enormous amount of information shared and that ONR was still working with the licensees on improvements related to Mike's report. C. Patchett introduced John Donald who is involved in the Fukushima work within ONR.

6.3 John Donald described two reports (interim and final) produced by Mike Weightman, ONR's Chief Nuclear Inspector. J. Donald stated that the reports were wide ranging and did not just look at external hazards it looked also at the way events progressed. It considered information from European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and especially looked at the issues of power blackouts and loss of cooling. The stress tests formed a sub-set of Mike Weightman's report. J. Donald said the operators were responding well and that they were inputting their own ideas and views. An external peer review showed that the UK was in a good position and that the improvement plan was ambitious. J. Donald said he had not seen Gordon Taylor's report and that the provenance of the information was key but would look at other reports and assess this. John also said that as plants are decommissioned, more information will come to light. In fact he said that Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are still providing useful information.

6.4 Derek Lamming said that after Fukushima happened, he had looked at seismic maps which showed another nuclear power station near the epicentre - Onagawa. There was no disaster involving this power station. He said that the plant was a newer design and had a higher freeboard and people were able to take refuge. The reactor shut-down normally and wasn't damaged. J. Donald said that was because, for Onagawa, the design basis was correct whereas for Fukushima, the design basis was not correct. D. Lamming went on to say that said that the idea of shutting down every nuclear station because of a defect in one of them is not sensible.

6.5 C. Collingridge asked for a special meeting for women to discuss gender issues and the protection of women and children saying that the risks to them were higher. The Chair suggested that this was not ONR's role and C. Patchett said that all ONR decisions will be published online and it will consider risks to all persons.

7. **Low level waste monitoring**

7.1 A questioner who did not give his name asked about low-level radiation exposure and the government's commitments given in the OSPAR treaty to reduce discharges to zero. He asked what the panel's view was on the progress towards zero discharges. S. Nicholson said that discharges from the Hinkley Point A site were very low and were regulated by the Environment Agency

7.2 Alan McGoff said that OSPAR had been implemented in the UK by placing two requirements on sites producing discharges. He said these were to use best available techniques (BAT) to control discharges and to ensure that impacts were below the dose-limit. He stated that the discharges from Hinkley Point A were low, and resulted in doses of just a few percent of the dose-limit. The questioner asked what progress is being made towards zero discharges. Alan said that the OSPAR commitment was not zero discharges, but that there should be zero contribution to existing (background) levels.

7.3 J. Brown asked how many people had read Ian Fairlie's paper showing that risks are underestimated. The Chair stated that this paper actually contained a hypothesis and was based on information from the KiKK report.

7.4 David Griffiths reported that he has seen the KiKK report, which related to BWRs (Boiling Water Reactors). There was nothing to show the such a peak in discharges occurred. The Environment Agency will provide data to Sizewell SSG meeting. He also stated that the Environment Agency asked for half-hourly discharge measurements but they found nothing.

8. **Emergency arrangements**

8.1 A questioner (the questioner did not give name) reported that he had spent some time in Japan talking to people after the Fukushima accident and many said that the emergency services response was a mess. He asked what information ONR have on the emergency planning and asked for an explanation of ONR's responsibilities in relation to ensuring adequate preparations for local communities.

8.2 P. Dicks said that the duties with regard to the provision of information were placed on the local authority by the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) which includes the requirement for detailed information and for the concept of extendibility. This considers the requirement for multi-agency response. There is a testing regime where plans are tested every three years. Additionally there are annual witnessed exercises on the sites. The Hinkley Point plan has been tested and although there were learning points, it was deemed adequate. REPPIR requires provision of information to the public and all interested parties get together through NEPLG (Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group) which is chaired by DECC. NEPLG also issues and reviews consolidated guidance for all those involved in developing site-specific emergency plans at a local level, and reviews the results of off-site exercises to make sure lessons are learned, and the process of incremental improvement continues. But Paul said that in all these areas more could be done as a regulator and 'UK plc'.

8.3 A questioner (the questioner did not give name) said she was concerned about the local authority's ability to cope. She said that cuts, early retirement and loss of knowledge were a problem and asked what ONR could do to influence this to ensure Somerset County Council have enough resources and a detailed plan. The questioner also suggested that the concentric circles around power stations are not big enough.

8.4 C. Patchett responded to say there is a detailed emergency planning zone around each facility but there is also possibility of extendibility. He also commented that after the 9/11 event in the US, the Government wanted extra reassurance of the UK's ability to cope. An exercise at Bradwell in Essex tested a beyond-design-basis event and therefore tested ability to cope beyond the detailed emergency planning zone. This tested responses out to 120 miles from the site. The conclusion was that extendibility was there, but that in all these areas more could be done in terms of making visible how this can rolled out across the country. C. Patchett confirmed that it was up to local authority to demonstrate they could cope.

8.5 N. Clark said that in conversations she had had with first responders, the view on the front-line was that they were not content to response and would expect the licensee to take the lead. She said the Bridgwater rest stations would not cope.

8.6 C. Patchett stated that ONR is satisfied that site training and knowledge is sufficient to deal with an emergency and reiterated the local authority's duty to provide a sufficient off-site plan. ONR sees these plans and also witnesses tests of the plans on a regular basis to ensure all duty holders were able to meet their responsibilities.

The Chair brought the meeting to a conclusion there and thanked everyone for their participation. C.Patchett thanked everyone for coming and said he wanted to continue to have conversations about the issues raised.